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on the Modern Productivity Paradox 
By PAUL A.  DAVID* 
Many  observers of  recent  trends in  the 
industrialized  economies  of  the  West  have 
been  perplexed  by  the  conjecture of  rapid 
technological  innovation  with  disappoint- 
ingly slow gains in measured productivity. A 
generation of  economists who were brought 
up to identify  increases in  total factor pro- 
ductivity  indexes  with "technical progress" 
has found it quite paradoxical for the growth 
accountants'  residual measure of  "the  ad- 
vance of knowledge" to have vanished at the 
very same time that a wave of major innova- 
tions was appearing-in  microelectronics, in 
communications technologies based on lasers 
and fiber optics, in composite materials, and 
in biotechnology. Disappointments with "  the 
computer revolution" and the newly dawned 
"information  age" in this regard have been 
keenly felt.  Indeed, the notion that there is 
something  anomalous  about  the  prevailing 
state of affairs has drawn much of its appeal 
from  the  apparent  failure of  the  wave  of 
innovations based on the microprocessor  and 
the memory chip to elicit a surge of growth 
in productivity from the sectors of the U.S. 
economy  that  recently have been  investing 
so  heavily  in  electronic  data  processing 
equipment (see, for example, Stephen Roach, 
1987,  1988;  Martin Baily and Robert Gor- 
don, 1988). This latter aspect of the so-called 
" productivity  paradox"  attained  popular 
currency  in  the  succinct  formulation  at- 
tributed to Robert Solow: "We see the com- 
puters  everywhere but  in  the  productivity 
statistics." 
If, however, we are prepared to approach 
the matter from the perspective afforded by 
the  economic  history of  the large technical 
systems characteristic of network industries, 
and to keep in mind a time-scale appropriate 
for  thinking  about  transitions from  estab- 
lished technological regimes to their respec- 
tive successor regimes, many features of the 
so-called productivity paradox will be found 
to be neither so unprecedented nor so puz- 
zling as they might otherwise appear. 
I 
My aim here simply is to convince modern 
economic analysts (whether perplexed by the 
productivity slowdown, or not) of the imme- 
diate relevance of historical studies that trace 
the  evolution  of  techno-economic  regimes 
formed around general purpose engines.' The 
latter,  typically,  are key functional compo- 
nents  embodied  in  hardware that  can  be 
applied as elements or modular units of the 
engineering  designs  developed  for  a  wide 
variety  of  specific  operations or  processes. 
Accordingly,  they  are  found  ubiquitously 
distributed  throughout such  systems  when 
the  latter have  attained their mature, fully 
elaborated state. James Watt's (separate con- 
denser) steam engine design springs to mind 
readily as an example of an innovation that 
fulfilled  this  technological role  in  the  first 
industrial revolution. My  particular line  of 
argument will be better served, however, by 
directing notice  to  the parallel between the 
modern computer and another general pur- 
pose engine, one that figured prominently in 
what sometimes is called the "second Indus- 
trial Revolution"-namely,  the  electric dy- 
namo. (But, see also Herbert Simon, 1986.) 
Although  the  analogy  between  informa- 
tion  technology  and  electrical  technology 
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would  have  many  limitations if  taken very 
literally, it  proves illuminating nonetheless. 
Computer and dynamo each form the nodal 
elements of physically distributed (transmis- 
sion) networks. Both occupy key positions in 
a web  of  strongly complementary technical 
relationships that give rise to "network ex- 
ternality  effects"  of  various kinds,  and  so 
make issues of compatibility standardization 
important  for  business  strategy and public 
policy  (see  my  1987  paper and  my  paper 
with Julie Bunn, 1988). In both instances, we 
can recognize the emergence of an extended 
trajectory of incremental technical improve- 
ments, the gradual and protracted process of 
diffusion into  widespread use, and the con- 
fluence with  other streams of  technological 
innovation,  all of  which are interdependent 
features  of  the  dynamic  process  through 
which  a  general purpose engine acquires a 
broad  domain  of  specific applications (see 
Timothy  Bresnahan  and  Manuel  Trajten- 
berg, 1989). Moreover, each of the principal 
empirical phenomena that make up modem 
perceptions  of  a  productivity paradox had 
its striking historical precedent in the condi- 
tions  that obtained  a little less than a cen- 
tury ago in  the industrialized West, includ- 
ing  the pronounced slowdown in  industrial 
and  aggregate  productivity growth  experi- 
enced  during the 1890-1913 era by the two 
leading industrial countries, Britain and the 
United States (see my 1989 paper, pp. 12-15, 
for details). In 1900, contemporary observers 
well  might  have  remarked that the electric 
dynamos were to be seen "everywhere  but in 
the productivity statistics!" 
II 
At the turn of the century, farsighted engi- 
neers already had envisaged profound trans- 
formations  that  electrification would  bring 
to factories, stores, and homes. But the ma- 
terialization of  such visions hardly was im- 
minent. In 1899 in the United States, electric 
lighting was being used in a mere 3 percent 
of  all  residences (and in  only  8 percent of 
urban dwelling units); the horsepower capac- 
ity  of  all  (primary and  secondary) electric 
motors installed in manufacturing establish- 
ments in the country represented less than 5 
percent of factory mechanical drive. It would 
take another two decades, roughly speaking, 
for these aggregate measures of the extent of 
electrification to attain the 50 percent diffu- 
sion  level (see  my 1989 paper, Table 3, for 
estimates and sources). It may be remarked 
that, in 1900, an observer of the progress of 
the "Electrical Age" stood as far distant in 
time  from  the  introduction of  the  carbon 
filament incandescent lamp by Edison, and 
Swann  (1879),  and  of  the  Edison  central 
generating station in New York and London 
(1881), as today we stand from comparable 
"breakthrough" events in the computer rev- 
olution:  the  introduction of  the  1043 byte 
memory chip  (1969) and the silicon micro- 
processor (1970) by Intel. Although the pace 
of  the  computer's diffusion in  the business 
and public sectors of the industrialized soci- 
eties  during the past two decades has been 
faster  than  that  recorded for  the  dynamo 
during its comparable early phase of  adop- 
tion, it has been estimated that only 10 per- 
cent of the world's 50 million business enter- 
prises today are using computers, and only 2 
percent of  the world's business information 
has been digitized (see Peter Lewis, 1989). 
The  history  of  electrification after  1900 
(see  I. C. R.  Byatt, 1979; Thomas Hughes, 
1983; Ryoshin  Minami, 1987) lends consid- 
erable plausibility to the "regime transition 
thesis" of Christopher Freeman and Carlotta 
Perez (1990). They suggest that productivity 
growth has been sluggish, and very well might 
remain so because the emergence and elabo- 
ration  of  a  new  techno-economic  regime 
based on computer and communications in- 
novations  (supplanting the mature, ossified 
Fordist  regime  of  mass  production)  will, 
more than likely, be a protracted and histori- 
cally contingent affair. 
Certainly, the transformation of industrial 
processes by the new electric power technol- 
ogy  was a long-delayed and far from auto- 
matic business.  It did not  acquire real mo- 
mentum  in  the  United  States  until  after 
1914-17,  when  regulated  regional  utility 
rates  for  electricity  were lowered  substan- 
tially  in  relationship  to  the  general  price 
level (see my 1989 paper: Table 4, Fig. 14), 
and central station generating capacity came 
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isolated industrial plants. Furthermore, fac- 
tory electrification did not reach full fruition 
in  its  technical  development  nor  have  an 
impact on  productivity growth in manufac- 
turing before  the early 1920s. At  that time 
only  slightly more than half of  factory me- 
chanical drive capacity had been electrified. 
(On the significance for derived productivity 
growth of attaining 50 percent diffusion, see 
my 1989 paper, Appendix A.) This was four 
decades after the first central power station 
opened for business. 
The proximate source of the delay in the 
exploitation  of  the  productivity  improve- 
ment potential incipient in the dynamo revo- 
lution  was,  in  large part, the slow pace  of 
factory  electrification.  The  latter,  in  turn, 
was attributable to the unprofitability of re- 
placing still serviceable manufacturing  plants 
embodying production technologies adapted 
to  the old  regime of  mechanical power de- 
rived from water and steam. Thus, it was the 
American industries that were enjoying the 
most rapid expansion in the early twentieth 
century  (tobacco,  fabricated metals,  trans- 
portation equipment, and electrical machin- 
ery itself)  that  afforded greatest immediate 
scope for the construction of new, electrified 
plants along the lines recommended by pro- 
gressive  industrial  engineers  (see  Richard 
DuBoff,  1979,  p.  142;  and  Minami,  pp. 
138-41).  More widespread opportunities to 
embody  best-practice manufacturing appli- 
cations of electric power awaited the further 
physical  depreciation  of  durable  factory 
structures,  the  locational  obsolescence  of 
older-vintage industrial plants sited in urban 
core areas, and, ultimately, the development 
of a general fixed capital formation boom in 
the expansionary macroeconomic climate of 
the 1920s. 
The persistence of durable industrial facil- 
ities embodying older power generation and 
transmission  equipment had  further conse- 
quences that are worth noticing. During the 
phase  of  the  U.S.  factory  electrification 
movement extending from the mid-1890s to 
the eve of  the 1920s, the "group drive" sys- 
tem of power transmission remained in vogue 
(see  Duboff,  p.  144; Warren Devine,  1983, 
pp.  351,  354).  With  this  system (in  which 
electric motors turned separate shafting sec- 
tions, so that each motor would drive related 
groups  of  machines),  the  retrofitting  of 
steam- or water-powered plants typically en- 
tailed adding primary electric motors to the 
original  stock  of  equipment. While factory 
owners rationally could ignore the sunk costs 
of  the  existing  power transmission appara- 
tus, and simply calculate whether the bene- 
fits in  the  form  of  reduced power require- 
ments and improved machine speed control 
justified  the  marginal capital  expenditures 
required to  install  the group drive system, 
productivity  accountants  would  have  to 
reckon that the original belt and shaft equip- 
ment (and the primary engines that powered 
them) remained in place as available capac- 
ity. The effect would be to raise the capital- 
output  ratio  in  manufacturing, which mili- 
tated  against  rapid  gains  in  total  factor 
productivity (TFP)-especially  if the energy 
input savings and the quality improvements 
from better machine control were left out of 
the productivity calculation. 
This  sort  of  overlaying of  one  technical 
system  upon  a  preexisting stratum is  not 
unusual  during  historical  transitions  from 
one technological paradigm to the next. Ex- 
amples can be cited from the experience of 
the  steam  revolution  (G.  N.  von  Tunzel- 
mann,  1978,  pp.  142-43,  172-73).  Indeed, 
the  same  phenomenon  has  been  remarked 
upon recently in the case of the computer's 
application in numerous data processing and 
recording functions, where old  paper-based 
procedures are being retained alongside the 
new, microelectronic-based methods-  some- 
times to the detriment of each system's per- 
formance (see, for example, Baily and Gor- 
don, pp. 401-02). 
Finally, it would be a mistake to suppose 
that large potential gains from factory elec- 
trification were  obtainable from the begin- 
ning  of  the  century  onward, just  because 
there were farsighted electrical engineers who 
at  the  time  were  able  to  envisage  many 
sources  of  cost  savings  that  would  result 
from  exploiting  the  flexibility  of  a  power 
transmission system based on electric wires, 
and the efficiency of replacing the system of 
shafting  and  belts  with the so-called "unit 
drive" system. In the latter arrangement, in- 
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machines of all sizes (see Devine, pp. 362ff). 
The advantages of the unit drive for factory 
design turned out to extend well beyond the 
savings in inputs of fuel derived from elimi- 
nating  the need  to  keep all  the line  shafts 
turning,  and  the  greater energy  efficiency 
achieved by reducing friction losses in trans- 
mission.  Factory  structures could  be  radi- 
cally  redesigned once  the need  for bracing 
(to support the heavy shafting and belt-hous- 
ings for the transmission apparatus that typ- 
ically was mounted overhead) had been dis- 
pensed with. This afforded 1) savings in fixed 
capital through lighter factory construction, 
and 2) further capital savings from the shift 
to  building  single-story  factories,  whereas 
formerly the aim of reducing power losses in 
turning very long line shafts had dictated the 
erection of more costly multistory structures. 
Single-story, linear factory layouts, in  turn, 
permitted  3)  closer attention to  optimizing 
materials  handling,  and  flexible  reconfigu- 
ration  of  machine  placement and handling 
equipment  to  accommodate  subsequent 
changes  in  product  and  process  designs 
within the new structures. Related to this, 4) 
the modularity of the unit drive system and 
the  flexibility  of  wiring curtailed losses  of 
production incurred during maintenance, re- 
arrangement of  production lines, and plant 
retrofitting;  the  entire  power  system  no 
longer had to be shut down in order to make 
changes in one department or section of the 
mill. 
Although all this was clear enough in prin- 
ciple, the relevant point is that its implemen- 
tation on a wide scale required working out 
the details in  the context of many kinds of 
new  industrial  facilities,  in  many  different 
locales, thereby building up a cadre of expe- 
rienced factory architects and electrical engi- 
neers  familiar  with  the  new  approach  to 
manufacturing.  The  decentralized  sort  of 
learning process  that this entailed was  de- 
pendent  upon  the  volume  of  demand  for 
new  industrial facilities at  sites  that favor- 
ed  reliance  upon  purchased electricity  for 
power.  It  was,  moreover, inherently uncer- 
tain and slow  to gain momentum, owing in 
part to the structure of the industry respon- 
sible for supplying the capital that embodied 
the new, evolving technology. For, the busi- 
ness  of  constructing factories and shops re- 
mained  extremely unconcentrated, and was 
characterized by  a high rate of  turnover of 
firms  and  skilled  personnel.  Difficulties in 
internalizing and appropriating the benefits 
of  the technical knowledge acquired in such 
circumstances are likely to slow experience- 
based learning. A  theoretical analysis of  an 
interdependent  dynamic  process  involving 
diffusion and incremental innovations based 
upon  learning-by-doing (see my paper with 
Trond Olsen, 1986) demonstrates that where 
the capital goods  embodying the new tech- 
nology are competitively supplied, and there 
are  significant knowledge  spillovers among 
the firms in  the supplying industry, the re- 
sulting pace of  technology adoption will be 
slower than is socially optimal. 
III 
The  preceding  review of  the  sources  of 
"diffusion lags" bears directly on  the rela- 
tionship  between  the  timing of  movements 
in  industrial productivity, and  the  applica- 
tions  found  for  electric  power  within  the 
industrial sector. A somewhat different class 
of  considerations also holds part of  the ex- 
planation for the sluggish growth of produc- 
tivity in the United States prior to the 1920s. 
These have to do more with the deficiencies 
of  the  conventional  productivity measures, 
which are especially problematic in treating 
the new kinds of  products and process ap- 
plications  that  tend  to  be  found  for  an 
emergent general purpose technology during 
the initial phases of  its development. Here, 
too,  the  story  of  the  dynamo  revolution 
holds noteworthy precedents for some of the 
problems  frequently  mentioned  today  in 
connection  with  the  suspected  impact  of 
the  computer (see, Baily-Gordon; and Gor- 
don-Baily,  1989):  1)  unmeasured  quality 
changes associated with the introduction of 
novel  commodities;  and  2)  the  particular 
bias of  the new technology toward expand- 
ing  production  of  categories of  goods  and 
services  that  previously  were  not  being 
recorded in the national income accounts. 
In the case of the dynamo, initial commer- 
cial  applications  during the 1890-1914  era 
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ing  equipment  and  urban  transit systems. 
Notice  that  qualitative characteristics such 
as brightness, ease of maintenance, and fire 
safety were especially important attributes of 
incandescent  lighting  for  stores and  facto- 
ries, as well as for homes-the  early electric 
lighting systems having been designed to be 
closely competitive with illuminating gas on 
a cost  basis.  Likewise, the contributions to 
the improvement in economic welfare in the 
form of  faster trip speeds and shorter pas- 
senger  waiting  times  afforded  by  electric 
streetcars, and later by subways (not to men- 
tion the greater residential amenities enjoyed 
by urban workers who were enabled to com- 
mute  to  the  central business  district  from 
more salubrious residential neighborhoods), 
all remained largely uncaptured by the con- 
ventional  indexes  of  real product and pro- 
ductivity. 
Measurement biases of this kind persisted 
in  the later period of factory electrification, 
most notably in regard to some of the indi- 
rect  benefits  of  implementing  the  "unit 
drive"  system.  One  of  these  was  the  im- 
provement in  machine control achieved by 
eliminating the problem of belt slippage and 
installing  variable  speed  d.c.  motors.  This 
yielded  better  quality,  more  standardized 
output  without  commensurately  increased 
costs  (see  Devine,  pp.  363ff).  Factory  de- 
signs  adapted to  the unit drive system also 
brought  improvements  in  working  condi- 
tions and safety. Lighter, cleaner workshops 
were made  possible  by  the introduction of 
skylights, where formerly overhead transmis- 
sion apparatus had been mounted; and also 
by  the elimination of the myriad strands of 
rotating belting that previously swirled dust 
and grease through the factory atmosphere, 
and, where unenclosed within safety screen- 
ing, threatened to maim or kill workers who 
became caught up in them. 
These  more  qualitative indirect benefits, 
however, came as part of a package contain- 
ing other gains that, as has been seen, took 
the  form  of  more  readily quantifiable re- 
source savings. Consequently, a significantly 
positive  cross-section  association  can  be 
found between the rise in the industry's TFP 
growth rate (adjusted for purchased energy 
inputs) during the 1920s, vis-'a-vis  the 1910s, 
and  the  proportionate  increase  of  its  in- 
stalled secondary electric motor capacity be- 
tween  1919  and  1929.  Making use  of  this 
cross-section relationship, approximately  half 
of  the  5  percentage point  acceleration re- 
corded in the aggregate TFP growth rate of 
the  U.S.  manufacturing  sector  during 
1919-29  (compared  with  1909-19)  is  ac- 
counted for statistically simply by the growth 
in  manufacturing secondary electric motor 
capacity  during  that  decade  (see  my  1989 
paper, Table 5, and pp. 26-27). 
But,  even  that  did  not  exhaust  the  full 
productivity  ramifications  of  the  dynamo 
revolution in the industrial sector during the 
1920s.  An  important  source  of  measured 
productivity gains during this era has been 
found to be  the capital-saving effects of the 
technological and organizational innovations 
that underlay the growth of continuous pro- 
cess manufacturing, and the spread of  con- 
tinuous  shift-work,  most  notably  in  the 
petroleum products, paper, and chemical in- 
dustries (see John Lorant, 1966, chs. 3, 4, 5). 
Although  these  developments  did  not  in- 
volve  the  replacement  of  shafts  by  wires, 
they were bound up indirectly with the new 
technological  regime  build  up  around  the 
dynamo.  Advances  in  automatic  process 
control  engineering  were  dependent  upon 
use  of  electrical  instrumentation and  elec- 
tro-mechanical relays. More fundamentally, 
electrification was a key complementary ele- 
ment  in  the  foregoing innovations because 
pulp-  and  paper-making, chemical produc- 
tion,  and  petroleum  refining (like  the  pri- 
mary metals,  and  the stone, clay and glass 
industries  where  there were  similar move- 
ments towards electrical instrumentation for 
process control, and greater intensity in the 
utilization  of  fixed  facilities)  were  the 
branches of manufacture that made particu- 
larly heavy use of electricity for process heat. 
IV 
Closer study of some economic history of 
technology, and familiarity with the story of 
the dynamo revolution in particular, should 
help us avoid both the pitfall of undue san- 
guinity  and  the  pitfall  of  unrealistic impa- 
tience into which current discussions of  the 360  AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS  MA  Y 1990 
productivity paradox seem to plunge all too 
frequently.  Some  closing  words of  caution 
are warranted, however, to guard against the 
dangers of embracing the historical analogy 
too literally. 
Computers are not  dynamos. The nature 
of man-machine interactions and the techni- 
cal problems of designing efficient interfaces 
for humans  and computers are enormously 
more  subtle  and  complex  than  those  that 
arose in the implementation of electric light- 
ing and power technology. Moreover, infor- 
mation  as  an  economic  commodity  is  not 
like  electric  current. It  has  special  attrib- 
utes  (lack  of  superadditivity and negligible 
marginal costs  of  transfer) that make direct 
measurement of  its  production and  alloca- 
tion very difficult and reliance upon conven- 
tional  market  processes  very  problematic. 
Information is  different, too, in  that it  can 
give  rise  to  "overload," a  special  form  of 
congestion effect arising from inhibitions on 
the  exercise  of  the  option  of  free disposal 
usually  presumed  to  characterize standard 
economic  commodities.  Negligible  costs  of 
distribution  are  one  cause  of  "overload"; 
information  transmitters are encouraged to 
be indiscriminate in broadcasting their out- 
put. At the user end, free disposal may be an 
unjustified assumption in the economic anal- 
ysis of information systems, because our cul- 
tural inheritance assigns high value to (previ- 
ously scarce) information, predisposing us to 
try  screening  whatever becomes  available. 
Yet,  screening is  costly;  while it  can  con- 
tribute  to  a  risk-averse information  recip- 
ient's personal welfare, the growing duplica- 
tive allocation of human resources to coping 
with information overload may displace ac- 
tivities producing commodities that are bet- 
ter  recorded  by  the  national  income  ac- 
counts. 
In defense of the historical analogy drawn 
here, the information structures  of firms (i.e., 
the  type  of  data  they collect and generate, 
the  way  they  distribute and process it  for 
interpretation) may be seen as direct coun- 
terparts of the physical layouts and materials 
flow patterns of production and transporta- 
tion systems. In one sense they are, for they 
constitute  a  form  of  sunk  costs,  and  the 
variable  cost  of  utilizing  such  a  structure 
does not rise significantly as they age. Unlike 
those  conventional  structures  and  equip- 
ment stocks, however, information structures 
per se do not automatically undergo signifi- 
cant  physical  depreciation.  Although  they 
may  become  economically obsolete  and be 
scrapped  on  that  account,  one  cannot  de- 
pend on the mere passage of time to create 
occasions to radically redesign a firm's infor- 
mation  structures  and  operating  modes. 
Consequently, there is likely to be a strong 
inertial component in the evolution of infor- 
mation-intensive production organizations. 
But,  even  these  cautionary qualifications 
serve  only  to  further reinforce one  of  the 
main  thrusts of  the dynamo analogy. They 
suggest the existence of special difficulties in 
the commercialization of novel (information) 
technologies  that need  to  be  overcome be- 
fore the mass of information-users can bene- 
fit in their roles as producers, and do so in 
ways reflected by our traditional, market-ori- 
ented indicators of productivity. 
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